11. Other Irregularities in the WSI Operations

There were many other irregularities in the WSI. They related both to basic requirements in appointments for duty and, for example, the performance of tender procedures concerning the purchase of specialized equipment. There were also gross irregularities regarding the counter-intelligence guard for institutions and military units.
Because the WSI structures were based on the graduates of Soviet courses, barriers were created for candidates from outside those circles. As a consequence, the staff policy aimed at preserving the old grid.

Staff-related Irregularities
The selection of new candidates for duty was not conducted on the basis of correct criteria. The negative premises acquired about the candidates for duty and WSI soldiers did not have any impact on staff-related decisions.
The documentation of procedures related to the selection of candidates for duty indicates that in many cases, in spite of negative opinions about the candidate (e.g. negative psychological profile, alcohol abuse, information about lack of guarantee that secrets will be observed, important counter-indications for operational work), positive decisions were made regarding the acceptance for service in the WSI. There were also situations where the officers tried to influence their subordinates to hide unfavorable facts in their CV.
The negative information collected by the Internal Security Office (BBW) (e.g. about alcohol abuse and detox treatment, crimes and offences) did not have any major impact on the further career of a given soldier, his promotions, place in the service, access to state secrets or delegation to foreign posts.
There were scandalous situations where soldiers were sent abroad in spite of negative premises.
In many cases, the obtained information indicated lack of warranty that secrets would be observed, but in almost every such case those people received security clearance for access to information with top-secret clause. There were even case when someone occupied a commanding position in spite of lack of access to classified information.
Due to the use of feigned recruitment and vetting procedures, the abuse of alcohol by many WSI officers became a serious problem. This practice was common and widely accepted. It became a norm to drink at work.
The described practices did not only constitute a violation of internal regulations or negligence of duties. They also caused many instances of misappropriation, e.g. in connection with fund "O" management. From the information obtained by the Verification Commission It can be seen that the WSI operational funds were often treated as an additional source of income, some kind of additional pay. At the slightest excuse money was paid out to private pockets of the soldiers and their HUMINT sources.
In 1999-2001, the WSI soldiers from Counter-Intelligence Section in Cracow committed forgery of settlement documents related to the costs of their operational undertakings.
From the documents collected by BBW WSI it can be seen that the Safehouse (SH) in the Counter-Intelligence Section in Cracow was uncovered; there were also the instances where the benefits of sexual nature were obtained. In February 2004, BBW WSI received information about improper behavior of the Deputy Chief of the WSI Unit in Cracow, Lt. Col. W. Wójcik. This information was confirmed by the officer covering the WSI Cracow Unit (it is interesting that his memo – dated January 30, 2004 – was probably antedated.
As a result of the conducted verification, that information found confirmation in the accounts of three secret collaborators of BBW (RA "W", RA “BI”, RA "B"), obtained in June 2004. From the collected materials it resulted that ppłk Wójcik led to uncovering of the SHs he was responsible for ("L", which he used as his second flat, "M" – used for sexual contacts as well as "R" in Zakopane and "G" in Krynica), letting unauthorized people in there; he also used the operational car and the driver for his private needs (the driver was, among others, doing the shopping for his superior’s needs and at the superior’s consent used the SH "R" in Zakopane during his holiday with the family) and abused his position to obtain benefits of sexual nature (by employing M. M. in the WSI financial division on the terms “job in exchange for sex” and finding a job for D. M. in military hospital on the same terms (both persons were let in the SH for sexual purposes)). Aside from that, Lt. Col. W. let a former WSI officer enter the premises of the unit under W.’s command, for that officer to prepare the Unit’s financial statements in W.’s place. There was also information that Lt. Col. Wójcik took psychotropic drugs.
On similar terms the operational premises were used illegally as accommodation for people who held commanding posts in the units to which the premises belonged. This was the case, among others, with the Safehouse "T", built in 1997-1998. It was to be used for training agents and officers under cover in the eastern direction. This undertaking was doomed to be unsuccessful from the start since among the people familiar with the case were at least several officers trained in the USSR and the Safehouse itself was used by the WSI officers for holiday purposes, often together with their families. An example of this practice is the memo dated July 22, 2003, where Lt. Col. Bogdan Świątek writes to his superior: "In order to ensure the natural concealment of [Safety House] “TARAS”, I apply for the consent for my stay there with my family from August 1 to August 15, 2003. The stay in the premises will be shown as a summer holiday in the framework of my holiday leave”.. The costs of stay were paid from the operational fund. The construction of SH "T" cost 220 thousand zlotys, and the maintenance costs in 1998-2001 amounted to over 30 thousand zlotys. All expenses were covered from the WSI budget. The liability for those irregularities rests with the chiefs of units 24 and 34, chiefs of counter-intelligence and intelligence and finally the WSI Chiefs: Gen. Dukaczewski and Gen. Zukowski.

Irregularities in the Organization of Purchases
An important field for misappropriations in the WSI were the purchases of specialized equipment for the divisions handling the technical side of operational actions.
It has become an unwritten rule that the entities dealing in the distribution and service of special technique equipment employed former soldiers of the WSI and the Polish Armed Forces. This situation caused that those companies run a market surveillance through their employees coming from the WSI who had contacts with their former colleagues in the WSI and thus obtained from them in advance the information about planned purchases of necessary equipment. In many cases, only one company, which had information about the purchases planned by the WSI, entered the tender. The information about tenders for equipment for WSI often did not reach at all any other interested companies, operating on the market. This situation could indicate the existence of a collusion between the parties, where both sides derived unlawful benefits.
Company SILTEC was established in 1982, probably as a cover company for the 2nd Directorate of General Staff of the People’s Polish Armed Forces. In agreement with the company DGT-System, they informally divided the market of IT and telecommunications supplies for the Polish Armed Forces between themselves, winning all major tenders (some worth a dozen million zlotys each). Such action allowed them to considerably (by app. 30-40%) overprice in relation to the market conditions.
In 2000, in the tender for TEMPEST-class computers, SIEMENS made a bid next to SILTEC, offering the workstations about 20,000 zlotys/pc cheaper than the competition. The tender was, however, won by SILTEC. This was possible primarily owning to the support of Gen. Wojciech Wojciechowski from the General Directorate of Command and Communications, General Staff, Polish Armed Forces, a college friend of Andrzej Pokrzewnicki – one of the co-owners of SILTEC. It was not the first time that gen. Wojciechowski actively supported and favored SILTEC, indicating it as the sole supplier of IT equipment to the Polish Armed Forces.
When analyzing the actions aimed at the purchase of specialized equipment from predetermined companies, it is worth citing the behavior aimed not only at evading the law, but in particular the possible attempts to influence the text of statutory provisions.
The first efforts aimed at purchasing SILTEC’s cryptographic equipment were taken as early as in 2001. The legal regulations in force then did not allow for purchase and admission to use of any equipment which did not pass the appropriate certification process. In 2005, the provisions of the Act on Access to Restricted Information were amended. There was a deep change in the text of Article 60 and subsequent articles. From the possessed information It can be seen that the WSI counted on the enactment of the regulation in such a form that would allow the Chief of relevant service to give consent for use of cryptographic equipment for a "confidential" clause, without conducting the appropriate certification tests. However, such editing of the provision met the firm protest of the Sejm’s experts. They pointed inter alia to corruptive nature of the aforesaid provision. In the end, a provision was adopted that allowed for admission of the discussed equipment to use conditionally, for the period of 2 years. The services’ representatives assured that such solution could be used only in exceptional situations, e.g. lack of proper equipment, in field conditions, during foreign missions. The above-mentioned assurances, in the light of efforts taken since 2001 with the aim to purchase cryptographic equipment from a specific company, which was known from the start not to have met and never to meet the statutory requirements, may rise serious doubts. The author of the memo on interpretation of the Article 60.7 of the discussed Act, Gen. Dukaczewski must have been fully aware of the violation of the law which followed the enactment of the Act amendment. The sad end of the described, not fully effective, efforts, was the signing of the “Annex to the Concept of Cryptographic Protection System Development in the Ministry of National Defense” by Minister Jerzy Szmajdziński, WSI Chief Gen. Marek Dukaczewski and the Chief General of Command and Communications Directorate Gen. Stanisław Krysiński in May 2005. In that document, they de facto approved the plan to disregard the existing regulations in the accreditation procedure related to the cryptographic equipment offered by SILTEC. This is an example of completely instrumental use of the law to secure someone’s particularistic interest with obvious harm to the level of state secret security, which by the law should be been protected exactly by the WSI.
The descried unexceptional actions caused measurable losses for the State budget. They also constituted a great danger to the State security by accrediting cryptographic equipment without required tests. The equipment admitted to use that way is or was used by the people who hold the highest state offices, including the President of the Republic of Poland, BBN Chief, Minister of National Defense, Chief of MOD Secretarial Office, Secretary of the State – First Deputy Minister of National Defense, Chief of General Staff of Polish Armed Forces, WSI Chief or Chief Commander of the Military Police. It is also worth noting that if it was decided to develop services’ own solutions instead of spending many years making efforts to purchase third party equipment, it would have been probably implemented in the same timeframe.
The lack of control and arbitrary use of state money were nearly an every-day occurrence in the WSI. There were situations where no tender principles were applied whatsoever and specialized equipment was purchased without any procedures. In one of the revealed cases, a Polish diplomatic post took part in it.
In this context, the information provided to the Verification Commission that there was an informal group within the WSI, associated with Gen. Dukaczewski, is crucial. That group, owing to the staff appointed according to its own principles and used as a some type of a lobbying group or pressure group when needed, supposedly had opportunities to carry out any task, not necessarily legal and related to the services operation. A “circle” of people who supported and covered their actions for each other was created and remained beyond any control.
The irregularities in tender procedures, which occurred in the WSI, were also recorded in the case "P", run since 2005. When conducting that case, the WSI officers determined that the tender procedures were usually badly organized. The "sole source contract" procedure was used too frequently, with the detriment to the WSI; similarly, the tenders were divided into smaller procedures in order to go around the law. Usually, there was no announcement published in the “Public Procurement Bulletin” and invitations to bid were only sent to several friendly companies, without confronting their offers on a broader market. In 2004, for example, a company INSAM was selected that was entered into the National Court Register 8 days after having won the tender. The culmination of case "P" was the notification of the military prosecution about suspected crime. It is also interesting in this case that the entire proceedings were limited to relatively low-ranking officers. The most senior officer among them held the rank of "major".

Irregularities Related to Counter-Intelligence Guard
It was interesting how the proper counter-intelligence guard of institutions and military units on the part of the WSI, which were obligated to run surveillance on those entities, was missing. The WSI should have controlled, among others, whether the civil business entities that co-operate with military institutions do not conduct any criminal activities – in this respect, however, lack of proper reaction of the WSI was observed. There were obvious instances of informal ties between senior officers of the Polish Armed Forces and the representatives of business and state machine. The WSI operatives acquired information about irregularities and provided that information to their superiors, however the latter did not draw proper conclusions from those reports.
The lack of proper counter-intelligence guard took place for example in relation to the activities of Fundacja Pilotów i Spadochroniarzy “Gloria Victis Aeronauticus” [Pilots & Parachutists], headed by Maj. Pilot Andrzej Wydrych. By the order of the Minister of National Defense, Wydrych was delegated to work in the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy. Since the early 90-ties, his foundation has been renting six buildings of the Modlin Garrison Command, located in the area of the airport of 45 Air TES. After several years, it turned out that the Foundation’s premises were used to store smuggled spirit.
The Verification Commission has also took notice of a pathological grid related to the construction investments and services carried out by the Polish Armed Forces. The information acquired by the WSI unit in Bydgoszcz pointed that there were regular meeting held in that area, with the participation of senior officers of the Polish Armed Forces, politicians, representatives of local business and authorities. Those meetings were referred to as “ROLOWISKO” (with the year of occurrence added). The meetings have their own internal rules and anthem. The name derives from the surname of one of the previous Chiefs of Accommodation and Construction Service of Pomorze Military District, Anatol Rola. During those meetings, agreements were made and specific investments or performance services were opted for, on preference terms. The purchase orders went to the companies associated with "ROLOWISKO", while the completion costs significantly exceeded the cost estimate value. In the next year, carefully selected companies, belonging to "ROLOWISKO", were invited to bid.
The potential profits were to be shared among all those who opted. Some of those investments were carried out for military purposes with active participation of senior officers of the Polish Armed Forces. All was supposedly taking place with seeming observance of tender regulations. This practice applies to the projects carried out by the Rejonowe Zakłady Infrastruktury (Regional Infrastructural Plants – RZI) and Zakład Inwestycji i Organizacji Traktatu Północnoatlantyckiego (NATO Investment and Organization Plant – ZIOTP). That goal was achieved by carrying out the tenders under special procedure, referring to the State security interest. ZIOTP applied to the minister competent for military infrastructure matters for the consent to this procedure and then selected companies were invited to bid.
The main architect of this informal structure was Gen. (Reserve) Tadeusz Głowacki who held various positions in the Accommodation and Construction Service divisions of the Ministry of National Defense. Through his contacts inter alia with the former ZIOTP Director, Jan Antoniuk, and the Director of Military Office of Construction Projects in Poznań (Pikulik), he influenced the authorities’ decisions.
Głowacki was associated with the owner of Przedsiębiorstwo Wielobranżowe "LECH". That limited liability company gained the greatest benefits from "ROLOWISKO". Głowacki also had close contacts with Tomasz Woźniak, owner of the company "MEGA" (and a former SLD councilman in Bydgoszcz). "MEGA" was a sub-contractor of "LECH". On behalf of the MOD Infrastructure Department, the investment was supervised by Col. Andrzej Erdman, former subordinate of Col. Głowacki from RZI in Bydgoszcz.
An important role in this undertaking was played by the former Director of MOD Infrastructure Department, Maj Henryk Grobelny. MOD considered him the "right hand" of Deputy Minister Janusz Zemke. From the obtained information It can be seen that H. Grobelny was the initiator of the MOD’s takeover of a palace and park complex in Samostrzele, on the pretext of placing the JFTC headquarters there. That complex was later brought by the Military Property Agency (AMW) into company GROMADA AMW as a contribution in kind; H. Grobelny, who in his capacity of a ministry official decided to award the contract for construction of the Bydgoszcz JFTC hotel to Gromada AMW, became a member of Supervisory Board of that company.
The Verification Commission was informed that H. Grobelny “had internal information in advance”.. Together with another former officer of the Security Service, he set up a company GROMADA sp. z o.o. which planned to build, together with AMW, a hotel in Bydgoszcz, at the NATO Joint Force Training Center. In accordance with the information provided to the VC, “the AMW brought as a contribution in kind the real property located in the Centro of Bydgoszcz at 2 Szubińska Street. However, the company went bankrupt, because no bank agreed to credit that investment”.
The decision of the transfer of the palace in Samostrzele was made by the Deputy Minister of National Defense, J. Zemke. Also T. Głowacki, the initiator of “ROLOWISKO”, and J. Antoniuk, former Director of ZIOTP, were associated with Deputy Minister J. Zemke. The Deputy Minister J. Zemke maintained contacts also with the owner of the company "M".
The WSI received information about those irregularities and strange HR rules in the institutions responsible for investments, among others, in ZIOTP, but they did not use it. The Verification Commission learnt that the operatives acquired “information indicating the commitment of crime and tort”. Such information was conveyed to the superiors, but no proceedings were ever instigated. According to the information obtained by the Verification Commission, all memos made about that investment “were not used” by the superior, Lt. Col. Waldemar Siatkowski. The irregularities around the constructions in Bydgoszcz were notified to the WSI chiefs in the Army.
In the light of the cited facts, the conduct of the following people meets the disposition contained in Article 70a.1 and 70a.2.2 of the Act on Provisions Implementing the Act on Military Counter-Intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service and the Act on the service of the officers of Military Counter-Intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service, dated June 9, 2006: Brig. Gen. Marek Dukaczewski, Brig. Gen. Jan Żukowski, Col. Glonek, Col. Dobrosław Mąka, Col. Jerzy Cichosz, Col. Andrzej Dańczak, Col. Krzysztof Polkowski, Lt. Col. Bogdan Grenich, Lt. Col. Wojciech Wójcik, Lt. Col. Janusz Adamkiewicz, Lt. Col. Bogdan Świątek, Maj. Werchner, Maj. Paweł Grabon, Maj. Krawiec, Maj. Pawula, Maj. Andrzej Wydrych, Cpt. Wierzbicki, Cpt. Burliga.
The activities of Gen. Wojciech Wojciechowski, Gen. Henryk Tacik, Gen. Stanisław Krysiński, Gen. Henryk Szumski, Maj. Gen. Wojciech Kubiak and Col. Marek Sobczek meet the disposition of Article 70a.2.1 of the aforecited Act.
The WSI Chief in the described period was Brig Gen. Marek Dukaczewski.
Article 5.1 of the Act on the Office of the Minister of National Defense, dated December 14, 1995, contained the regulation stating that the Military Information Services are subordinated directly to that Minister. That regulation was specified in a greater detail in § 1.16 of the Ordinance of the Council of Ministers on the Detailed Scope of Competencies of the Minister of National Defense dated July 9, 1996. This regulation imposed on the Minister of National Defense the obligation to exercise supervision over the activities of the Military Information Services, including in particular their operational actions and investigations. Pursuant to the Military Information Services Act of July 9, 2003, the supervision over the activities of those services rested with the Minister of National Defense who appointed and dismissed the WSI Chief. By virtue of Article 9.1 of this Act, the WSI Chief was subordinated to the Minister of Defense directly. The Ministers of National Defense in the described period were: Stanisław Dobrzański, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Bronisław Komorowski, Jerzy Szmajdziński.
The facts cited in this chapter bring doubts as to the legality of conduct of the WSI soldiers; thus, the Verification Commission sent to the Supreme Military Prosecutor’s Office a notification of suspected crime, in compliance with Article 304 § 2 of the Code of Penal Procedure.